

## TALK ON FUNDAMENTALS OF THINKING.

(July 14, 1975).

(Corfu, 1st litter, attached topic).

Let's start from a number of assumptions. Whenever it is a question of justifying something, one starts from assumptions, never from realities. We suppose that before the phenomenon that is presented to the conscience, this, structure. That is to say that consciousness is not limited to taking stimuli into account, No!, but also reacts, compares the stimuli with each other, performs operations that objects do not do. When I relate these recorders to each other, and I say, here are ten recorders or whatever, and here are five cups and ten packs of cigarettes; this operation that I do of relating these objects that are proper to one plane with each other, the others that are proper to another plane with each other, and so on. These operations are not done by the objects, they are not done by the recorders, they are not related to each other, except that they may be related to the power line that feeds them, these cigarette packs, they are not related to each other either. I carry out this operational system, this structuring thanks to certain operations of my consciousness, and it is not that the objects carry them out; are they distinguished? Isn't it true? So that we say that before the phenomena, consciousness structures, and that the phenomena, even though they are separated from each other, are structured in any way by the operations of consciousness, in any case they are structured, whatever they are. full knowledge or not. There is no object that appears in the field of consciousness that is not structured by it, so that, above all phenomena, consciousness structures. The structuring of thinking denotes, shows the concomitance between the phenomenon and consciousness; that is to say that, perceptual data is structured, we vary the structuring of consciousness; If the perceptual data strays considerably from the structuring that is being carried out, a new structuring is needed and the action that consciousness can have on objects thanks to the body, for example, in behavior, the action of consciousness in the world, also modifies the position of the objects.

So we call this relationship between consciousness and phenomenon: structuring relationship! The phenomenon, in terms of experience, not in terms of phenomenon, the lighter, not in terms of a lighter but insofar as it is an experience for me, insofar as I perceive it, insofar as I represent it, insofar as and insofar as it is the object of my consciousness and not the object of the world only; it is framed by the 'interest of conscience'.

That is to say, given an object of which I have experience, this object of experience appears to me as such and is articulated in one way or another, according to the interest exhibited by consciousness. The objects themselves have no interest, that is a characteristic of consciousness; but for me this recorder is much more interesting than this lighter, especially now that it has little gas. This recorder is much more interesting to me; so I see the recorder, the cigarette lighter here, and come up with that question, but this is much more interesting to me, and I frame this phenomenon, I frame it in a characteristic way, I fix it according to my interests. Well, but it could be said of course, that the opposite could be said, that the interest, that I am so interested in the recorder and less so in the lighter, that the interest is not explained because conscience places it, but that the interest is framed by the phenomenon, that is, I am interested in the recorder and not in the lighter because the recorder has characteristics in terms of an object that can satisfy a number of more interesting needs than the lighter, which is also true, which is also valid. So that monistic, antagonistic, dialectical explanations among themselves are not enough, where, typical of subjectivism, it is said that consciousness configures the world, idealism works above all in those parameters. The other positions claim the opposite, and are dialectically opposed to the first, saying that consciousness actually has certain interests because they are dictated by the conditions that objects place. I explain?. It is so, true and in both cases, and if not so, that consciousness places interests on the objects and that at the same time the objects dictate the interests of consciousness, in its adaptation to the world, if not so, not the structuring functioning of consciousness and the world and the feedback that is established between the object that acts in consciousness and the consciousness that modifies the world would be explained, it is precisely because these two positions are right, because things work, and it is not from

no way, because one of the two theses can work; Do you get the idea? The phenomenon-consciousness structure is dynamic, of course it is mobile, therefore so is the system of interests, placed at different times of thought, at one moment I am interested in one thing, at one moment I am interested in something else and so on. . If the phenomena that place interests in my consciousness were not dynamic, if the phenomena that put interests in my consciousness were not mobile, and the phenomena proper to my thinking were not mobile, then my interests would be fixed; and they are not because in fact, it is enough for me to feel a little hungry for my interests to lean in one direction, or it is enough for them to hit me with a honk for my interests to lean in another direction. It is not true?. So that this dynamic reality, both internal and external, causes the variation of interests in the relationship of consciousness with the world, and that is not a thing of another world either. Now of course, from this variability of interests, it can be abstracted, it can be removed from all these interests that are changing and that apparently would be a disorder, the moment of thinking can be abstracted, the moment of thinking that goes in quotes, goes in quotes because it refers to thinking and not to the moment of external time the moment in which thinking is an abstraction, the moment of thinking is the atom of thinking, it is the smallest part of thinking, the most elementary particle of thinking, which is an abstraction that in reality it does not exist, but that one works with it as an abstraction, one works with this abstraction to be able to fix the interest. At one moment I have this system of interests, at another moment, I have another system of interests, but it is not that there is a total variability of interests because then other types of operations could not take place in thinking. If everything were so dynamic and so fluid, and continually jumped from one interest to another, then operations such as the registration of a given interest, the comparison of the registration of that interest with the registration of another interest, could not take place, which are relations that I can establish in my thinking. Do you get the idea? No stable modality is extracted from this mobility, while from the abstractions of the passing of consciousness, abstractions that I at this moment call moments of thinking; from there the possibilities of relationship are concluded.

Do you get the idea? We speak then of moments of thinking when an interest is fixed, I fix an interest at that moment which is the recorder, now I am interested in the recorder, although my interests are very mobile now, my interest is the recorder, and within the recorder there are small interests that are circulating, but this interest that I fix, is for me a moment of thinking, we speak then of a moment of thinking when an interest is fixed. The fixation of an interest is of course a degree of determination of thought, a determination in two senses. I say that the fixation of interest on the recorder is a determination of thought, first in that by fixing my interest on the recorder, and by putting that ambit on the recorder, this determines my thinking, I cannot think about anything else until the interest placed on the recorder moves towards some other object that fixes my interest; so I can say, the recorder has these two levers, the recorder has a cassette, the recorder has a number of gadgets, what is happening there? It is happening that we fix my interest, that my thinking is determined by the position of the object Faced with the proposed interest, is that clear? Because if I don't get my interest out of the recorder and start talking about the lighter, what is this? there is no coherent thinking there, and there can only be coherent thinking to the extent that the interest is fixed, and by fixing the interest this interest is determined by the object posed, what, is it captured? Then it is a determination of thinking in the first place, because the object fixed in that sphere of thinking dictates the operations of thinking, and secondly it is a determination, because the very operations that thinking performs must refer to that and not to another. stuff. There is determination because the object places it and there is determination because consciousness places it, so that there is a determination in at least two different senses. That is the degree of determination of thinking that sets the limits; because there is determination of thinking, there are limits, there are delimitations, the one that sets the fields that may or may not be explicitly manifested; it is thanks to the determination of thought around the engraver, that certain areas are determined, 'up to here the engraver goes and no more than up to here', so that my thinking works within those limits. Now, there are characters in that object, characters that are interesting to think about, which are explicit, 'what I see here', but there are a number of implicit characters, which are not placed with all their presence before my perception, but nonetheless , my interest in the engraver looks towards them, orients itself, and will try to investigate and try to interpret these implicit characters placed in the object that has determined my interest. Yes, so I open the recorder, I

fixed in all its internal systems, and thus I discover a number of non-explicit characteristics that the object has, which have determined my interest in it. And then I distinguish between interest since it determines my thinking, the fact that by fixing my interest in thinking, I establish limits and within these limits of thinking I differentiate explicit and also implicit characters to which my operations refer, that is of simple. Interest and scope are typical of the abstraction of thinking in the face of phenomenon-consciousness mobility. In the absence of this ability to refer to objects with interest and to set scopes in the objects so as not to confuse and not get out of the objects; If this aptitude did not exist, there could be no thinking, much less coherent thinking! There are incoherent ways of thinking where the limits between objects disappear, where interests fluctuate so enormously that you don't know what you are thinking about. But that type of thinking doesn't interest us anymore, we don't call that thinking.

When we talk about thinking, we talk about a system of coherent operations, and of a system of operations that, although different according to the objects to which it is referring, have permanence, even if it is mobile in their representations, allows us to clarify laws and constants, even though The particular cases on which thinking is oriented are variable. Is the idea clear? We speak then of coherent thinking, to the extent that, although there is variation in thinking, there is permanence in the operations. The setting of interest and scope is certainly differential, now let's see: I say yes! that I have an interest, and I look at the recorder, and that when I look at the recorder I see explicit and implicit characters and this allows me to do many internal operations, and I also say that if I have set interest in the recorder I have set limits, and What can this fixing on the recorder be based on? Setting limits between the recorder and other things, seeing within that field of observation explicit and implicit characters in which otherwise, in a differential operation of thinking, I could not do such things if I did not establish differences between what the recorder is and what the recorder is not, the recorder is a field of interest for me and it is my object of interest to the extent that I know its limits, if I do not know the limits I try to establish them, and for the engraver to emerge partly, for it to emerge eminently, prominently, it is necessary that I establish differences with what the engraver is not. The fixation of interest, the creation of fields of thought, necessarily follows from the differentiating activity of the mind; it is because the mind establishes differences, that is precisely why it can set scopes, that it can set interests, and if there were no differentiating aptitude in thinking, everything would be disorderly linked by contiguity. The fixation of interest and scope is certainly differential, it is also a link between the differences and it synthesizes the relationships made between the differences; 'it's more the noise that the words make than the idea'.

The fixation of interest is basically differential, 'here is the recorder, and this is not the recorder, and since it's not the recorder, I'm not interested', and then I'm here and this is no longer, perfect! what else?. Well, it is differential, it is related between the differences, it turns out that now I am in the recorder and since I am in the recorder, it turns out that I see explicit, implicit characters, different parts of the recorder, this is not a mass, this has different things, and That is why I am observing it, and I am interested because there are a number of things here, things that are different from each other, of course, but things that are related to each other. The recorder consists of numerous pieces that are related to each other; What a discovery!..... Well, what is interesting is that those things that are related to each other, in that object, what I say about things related to each other, this structurality that I see in the recorder that Interested, this is showing me that I can establish relationships between the differences, in such a way that there is not only a differential aptitude, but that there is a relational aptitude between the differences. If I limited myself to defining thinking as such a system of ideation, that it proceeded exclusively by differences, I would not have the possibility of relating the phenomena to each other, I would not have the possibility of finding in this recorder that I observe a system of things, do you understand? Going by way of differences, I can't really determine the phenomenon, I can separate the phenomenon from others, but I can't do anything else.

Let's continue with the procedure, and let's go only for the differences, I differentiate the recorder from what is not the recorder, what else? I differentiate the keys because they are different from each other, I differentiate the reel because it is different from the keys, and so on, I differentiate everything. And what do I do with that continuous and infinite difference? Absolutely nothing! I can't build, I can't operate, then it is not enough for me to make thinking explicit by saying that it is a system

projected to the infinity of differential operations, but rather there is another operation with the mind, which allows the differences put into an act to allow that mind another system, another functioning, to the put differences it is also allowed to relate them to each other, but what? relates and how is the relationship system? The relationship system also works with differences, because a relationship cannot be established between things that have not been differentiated, in such a way that I cannot relate the different keys to each other and say, all of them are part of the recorder's keyboard, I cannot establish relationships between them. the keys, if I don't differentiate each one of them, so that it is valid that thinking works by differences, that thinking relates the differences, relates what?: the differences, and it can only relate differences, so so that the work of differentiation is still valid. So, even when establishing relationships, I establish relationships between differences. You will say: "but sometimes I can relate similar things and since they are similar, then I am not making differences".

Quite the opposite! I am making differences, and I am saying that this is different from the other, even though they are similar, and that they are related to each other because they are similar. And what do you think I'm doing? I'm relating differences, we'll see that a little later.

It relates between the differences and synthesizes the relationships made between the differences, in such a way that when I end by saying 'the structure of the recorder is such and such; and it is not possible for you to charge me three hundred dollars, when the full keyboard... let's see how much this, and this, and this, that can't cost more than a hundred dollars, you can't charge me that much!..."

Very well, we are talking about a different recorder, so I am establishing differences between different elements that make up the object, I am relating the elements to each other, and what am I relating? Differences! and then I am synthesizing, and then I am having a more or less complete image, more or less of what this recorder can be according to my degree of information, and then I am establishing relationships, more compact between the differences, I am synthesizing, but what has been my guiding thread? my guiding thread has always been the difference. Setting an interest or setting a scope is, first of all, differentiating, the differences... keys... of the different parts of the device, are related to the environment. Thinking is not legitimate, nor is thinking coherent in which relationships are established between objects that belong to different spheres, because, how can I say, for example: in this recorder, I fix the difference between this recorder and other objects, in this recorder? recorder there are, one, two, three, four, five, six keys and... seven (indicates another recorder key)

(Laughter), how am I going to relate differences from different fields? I relate differences within a certain field. Setting an interest or setting a scope is first of all differentiating. The differences are related to the environment, and are related because they are in that fixed scope and are not related to entities from another scope; the relation also being effected by differences, perfectly. If it were said, for example, according to this, that the relation  $A=A$  does not proceed by difference, for example that the idea of identity, that a thing is equal or identical to itself, and since I am the same, and he is he, and the other is he, and so on, that this object is the object; If it were said that the relation  $A$ , identical to  $A$ , does not proceed by difference, it would be necessary to emphasize at least: First: That there is a field of relation fixed by equality, here we have  $A$ , here we have =, here we have  $A$ , perfectly, first, there is a scope of relation given by equality, what we first say is that we are using the equals sign, to say this and this are identical, we are using the relation equals, well, what is that relation that we are establishing by saying  $A = A$ ? By doing that we are saying that the relationship is not addition, we are differentiating, it is not  $A$  plus  $A$ ; No! It is not subtraction, it is another type of relationship, it is a relationship that we differentiate, a precise relationship, that of equality, and what do we put? First question: given the entire relationship system that we know, we differentiate the What interests us, what is equality, this to begin with, so from the outset we put a relationship system, differentiating it from the entire relationship system that we know..... Well, you could say that  $A$  plus  $A$  for example, of course that they could, and could say many more things; however they look for the equal relationship, and they put it, and they make it differential. Second: as regards the entity  $A$ , and not the relationship sign that relates to itself and to which identity is assigned, saying that  $A$  is identical to itself is possible because of the following, it is possible because it is differentiated from  $B$ , from  $C$ , from  $E$ , from  $F$ , and so on, from all those structures that you know, and that from the outset already produce a difference, you take  $A$ , besides that  $A$  is identical

itself, it is not identical to B, C or D No! Isn't that right?, you differentiate it well, so we have established differences of the relation of equality with all the possible relations of A with all the entities that are not of A. We have differentiated it and we are left with A.

Third: A, as the first term of the relationship, 'look, there are two A's here', A put there = A put here, there are two A's, we say they are the same, but it doesn't matter, but there are two A's. A, like first term of the relation, it appears identical to itself, only if it is thought as a moment of thinking, and insofar as it is differentiated from another moment. According to this, even the relation of identity appears as a difference between terms for thinking. I say that the ashtray is identical to itself, only if I abstract from passing, because if I come across this ashtray that I photograph today, August 28, if I come across this same ashtray 30 years from now, I am not going to say when presenting the new photograph, that it is the same ashtray, or I am going to say, it is the same ashtray but it is changed; perfectly, I'm going to say, it's the same ashtray that has deteriorated, of course, that's all; it seems that identity works only with the abstract moment of thinking, because as soon as I stop thinking, in passing, then it is not possible for me to identify A at all. The famous discussion between these Greeks, that no one bathes twice in the same river, and that identity does not exist, but that everything is transformation, on the one hand, and that everything is identical, on the other hand, to itself, leads us to the most laughable situations over time. There were some defenders of the positions of identity, who in order to demonstrate that things were identical to themselves, a certain Zenón de Eleas for example, launched the following aporia, the following difficulty, and said thus: "A thing is identical to itself itself and cannot stop being, as in the case of an arrow, I shoot an arrow and the arrow at a given moment is where it is, or is it where it is not?, that it cannot be where it is not, and if it is where it is, it does not move, those aporias of Zeno de Eleas, like the case of the arrows, like the case of the swift Achilles and the tortoise, that Achilles can never reach the tortoise, because he has to go through spaces smaller and smaller, that the thing becomes infinitesimal and then Achilles has to hurry more and more to go through all those points, and the tortoise that moves a little is always at a greater mathematical distance from him. tried to argue the defenders of identity, to argue that the s things did not move, but things were actually illusion and the others got into such a mobilist flurry, of such a nature that, then, as everything changed, no law could be drawn from there; If this engraver at one moment is and at one point is not identical to itself, and it turns out that I pay Lola the three hundred pesos, and within half an hour, the engraver is a cabbage, for example, then I have a problem ; it cannot be worked this way. The established synthesis of the mode  $A = A$  arises from the difference of the other moments of thinking and as a new differential field that thinking sets. The synthesis assumes the difference of the relationships, structuring them ponderatively, therefore, differentiating the differences that do not coincide with the new scope that it sets. Therefore, the synthesis assumes the differences of the relationship. The relationships that I established by differences are assumed in the synthesis. The synthesis assumes the differences of the relationship, structuring them ponderatively, it is not enough to say that I have the relationships; I'm not saying anything with that. I have the relationships structured in a synthesis, and this is valid as long as I have weighting of different relationship systems, and say: "this key is much more important than the other when I am going to record, because it is the recording key, in another operation, 'this' (indicating another key) is more important, because I am going to establish a pause here, because I am going to give tone, and here I am going to give volume". And so on, so that I have been establishing not only relationships, but considerations. As soon as I determine a synthesis of a certain structure, then the synthesis assumes the differences of the relations, structuring them ponderatively. Therefore, if I ponder, if I say that this is more important, that the other is more important, the first red key to record, the other to delete, etc., if I am doing this type of weighting, I am necessarily proceeding by differences again .

So that the synthesis assumes the differences of the relationships, structuring them ponderatively: Therefore, differentiating the differences that do not coincide with the new scope that they put and thus I am building thinking with that type of process. It is the difference between the moments of thinking that makes it possible to establish equalities in a new moment of thinking: If there were no differences in moments of thinking, I could never say, for example, that  $A = A$ ;

would have to say nothing more than A. I could not establish the relationship of equality because there would be no sequence in thinking, and even if it is an abstraction A, and even if it says  $A = \text{itself}$ , it is possible that I can establish a relationship between that A with the other A, and to say that they are identical and that it is the same one that is transferred to two moments of thinking, I can say all this thanks to the fact that there is a sequence in thinking, and that sequence in thinking is given by the moments of thinking. If it were the same moment as a 'continuum' of thinking without moments, without differences between them, there would be no possibility of even establishing equalities. So, paradoxical as it may be, equality arises from differences, and concepts of equality cannot be established if I do not work with differences in moments of thought. And this is indisputable.

The structuring mobility of consciousness enables it to broaden its interests. For example, now I am interested in the other engraver, I am already interested in the three engravers, I am expanding my interests, structuring mobility, consciousness enables her to broaden her interests, to incorporate new phenomena for her understanding and to differentiate again at more levels. complexly structured. And wouldn't it be better than these three recorders, a slightly more complex recorder that can do more operations than these other three that I've been incorporating? Now I am no longer interested in these three, now I am interested in only one; It did not decrease but rather increased, and now I have an operating unit that has many more possibilities, how? Before I had three and now I have one, have I reduced, what is that? No! I have expanded, that one, has the added possibilities of these three different ones, I have made a new synthesis of an operative type! The mobility of consciousness enables it to broaden its interests, to incorporate new phenomena for its comprehension and to differentiate again, at more complexly structured levels, new differences that I establish between these objects: I have understood, I have seen their uses, their operations, now I differentiate, now I have an object more complexly structured than all this succession of little objects. The mobility of consciousness is explained only as a structure with the world and as a difference and relationship in such a structure. Thinking does not arise except by difference with the world. When we, at lower, more pedestrian levels of interpretation, speak of these mechanical functions of adaptation to the environment; the difference between the organism and its environment; that differences first arise within the environment, and that from the differences in the inorganic environment organic elements arise that are related in a particular way, are synthesized in a new way and emerge as new differences compared to previous processes, when we are explaining life (as a primate would do), when we are explaining life by the differences between the environment, the relationships between elements that come together, that are linked in a certain way, organisms emerge, and these organisms that are in an environment, They have differences with him. They are not the same organism! These environments are different from organisms, but these organisms live in these environments and then there is a difference in potential, the environment has things that the organism does not have, so the organism goes where there is what it does not have. By difference! He's not going to go where there's something he has. No! The amoeba is satisfied; it does not have to be directed, it is directed by difference, between what is and what is not, it is related to that nutritive element, assimilates it, synthesizes it, eliminates the elements that are no longer useful, etc... So when we speak of consciousness, we explain it as a structure with the world only, and as a difference and relation in such a structure; and we cannot make a lump between consciousness and world, but rather we speak of a consciousness-world structure, but in which there are differences between the operational aspect, which is consciousness, and the inert aspect, if you want to call it that; which is also dynamic, but of another type, which is the world, which is the medium. There are differences between consciousness and world. But it turns out that there is a structural relationship, so sometimes we ponder the world, and sometimes we ponder the structure of consciousness. But there are differential relationships between consciousness and the world and how much it differentiates and relates in such a structure, which also shows us the growing expansion of such a structure.

Thinking and the activities of thinking go along the line of increasing expansion, and insofar as I think, insofar as I expand the operations, because I have a greater number of differences that I relate to each other, that I synthesize, and in this amoeba as in the Heideggerian thinking. Equal!  
If we now consider the phenomenon in general, that is, the 'world-consciousness structure', now I am going to consider it as a phenomenon in general as well -because the world is a phenomenon, the consciousness

Science can also be considered as a phenomenon. Now I am going to consider the 'world-consciousness structure' as a phenomenon, and I am not going to consider only the world as a phenomenon, and consciousness as something other than a phenomenon. No sir! now I am going to consider both consciousness and the world as a phenomenon. That structure is a phenomenon, and since it is a phenomenon, it will have its laws. If now the phenomenon is considered in general, even the consciousness-world structure is evident as a phenomenon. Mobility in the consciousness-world structure can only be appreciated as a phenomenon; what I can appreciate is mobility, by no means immobility. I can appreciate mobility, and in it I can observe only moments of arrest, which sometimes makes me confuse things and say, now it is still, for example, now it is stopped, it is fixed, now it is satisfied, I say that it can only be appreciated mobility, and in it only moments of pause, which can be reduced only to variations of passing. There is a type of acceleration, a type of sequence, and another that relatively appears to me as stopping. Such a thing is not real from the point of view of the appreciation of the phenomenon! Detention is not real, it is an abstractive appreciation of the mind that works by comparison and by differences of moments of greater mobility. It is because I differentiate it, (therefore there is relativity in the appreciation) with the fastest moments in which the phenomenon occurs, that I say that "it is stopped". So a train is never stopped? A train is not stopped, it is relatively stopped, [in relation] to its mobility. There is no such kind of dwelling on any kind of phenomenon. There is a relative stoppage and that refers to a moment. But, throughout the sequence, between the time the train leaves and reaches another point, there is movement, and what I say is zero mobility; I establish that zero mobility by differences with the other mobilities, with the different speed changes of the phenomenon.

### **MOMENTS OF STOPPING THAT CAN BE REDUCED TO VARIATIONS IN THE PASSAGE, DIFFERENCES IN THE PASSAGE.**

The widest difference in the abstraction of the passing of the phenomenon is the concept of "BEING". That being that appears to me as the champion, as the maximum possible case of thinking, where the pause is made possible for me in being and presents itself to me in being. When I abstract from all the objects that exist, the idea of 'Being' -which does not exist, it is a conceptual 'Being' with which I can do operations-, that 'Being' appears to me as detained, and it is thanks to that Sort of a stop proper to abstraction, that I can do more or less constant operations, because if I couldn't abstract entities of the 'Being' type, for example, I couldn't do superior operations in thinking. The maximum of abstraction in detention, for example, or in timelessness, is 'Being' in general. And I say of 'Being' in general, which is everything, for example, everything is within the scope of 'Being', all things have 'Being'. The Being, therefore, is the essence of all things. And that being, which is the essence of all things, is stopped even if things move. So, I establish differences between the 'Being' and the 'Entity': the entities move and the 'Being', of which the entities participate, does not move. And that is an abstraction of thinking in terms of 'Being', it has made many logicians transfer this thought 'Being' to real 'Being'; and there is a great difference between the 'Being' thought and the 'Being' real. To make matters worse, this 'Being', since it encompasses all beings, has a capital letter, then it's easy: if this Being has a capital letter and we use language, and that 'Being' is also in all objects and all objects participate in it, it already sounds in a special way, and then it is not difficult to make the transfer of 'Being' to God, for example. Obvious! Thomas Aquinas did it cleanly.

So that when we speak in logical terms, the widest difference in the abstraction of the passing of the phenomenon is the concept of "Being". And the "Not Being" -that which always concerns Philosophy students-, the "Not Being" arises as a difference from the broader difference. If the concept of "Being" is the differential concept par excellence; "Non-Being" is the broadest differential concept of all given differences. In other words, the broadest difference in the abstraction of the passing of the phenomenon is "Being" and "Not Being" emerges as the difference of the broadest difference. You could not think in terms of "Being" and "Not Being", if you did not work with differences; and we are working with differences, in a broader sense, in an abstract sense. But actually it's the same operation system that when I'm talking about the keys and the recorder, it doesn't change much. It has more m-

It is ethical to speak of "Being" and "Not Being", but, in reality, the operations are the same, only taken to abstraction. They are not different! The "Not Being" emerges as a difference of the broader difference. "Being" and "Not Being" appear timeless, they reveal themselves as maximum abstractive moments: it is precisely in this that they are seen that they are nothing more than abstractions, that they are not realities, in that they appear as arrested, as universal, as eternal in some way, in that it is revealed that they are abstractions, that they are operations of thought and not realities. Because if, on the other hand, this "Being" and this "Not Being" had mobility, then they would become suspicious. But it turns out that no, that they appear as detained, as timeless, etc., so yes, it's clear; it is the very work of abstraction of thought. Therefore, when speaking of 'Being', it should be noted that, in logical (not psychological) terms, reference is being made to an abstraction and that, in psychological terms, the broader object of consciousness-structuring compensation is being mentioned. in the world. Do you notice the connection to the Pure Form?

Thus, when I speak of 'Being' in logical terms, I am speaking of the broadest logical conceptual breadth; but when I speak of 'Being' in psychological terms, I am speaking of the broadest object capable of structurally compensating for thinking, capable of compensating for all the acts of thinking that refer to different objects, to different things. In this case there is a 'Being' that psychologically can compensate all the dynamic operations of thinking that in practical life refer to different things. Psychologically, the 'Being' appears as a little body already compensating for all the activity of thinking. Well, this is best understood by the development of the Pure Form.

But they are different ways of thinking, because logical thinking is thinking as separate, as uninvolved, and thinking, seen in psychological terms, is thinking in which one is involved, and in which it has to do with operations of everything. another type, (not only with operations of logical thinking). When one is talking about thinking and one is talking about thinking in psychological terms, one is not talking about thinking in logical terms only. So, there is another type of commitment in psychologizing thinking, different from logical thinking. One has nothing to do with things when doing Logic. It is there with concepts, as with numbers, but it turns out that in everyday psychological thinking, one has to do with it. So the 'Being' seen from the psychological point of view, changes a lot to the 'Being' thought in logical terms.

When speaking of 'Being', it should be noted that, in logical terms, one is referring to an abstraction, and that in psychological terms, one is referring to the broader object of consciousness-structuring compensation in the world. The broader abstractions refer to 'Being' and its behaviour. When talking about logical thinking, a previous foundation is sought for logical thinking, and that has to do with the broadest possible ideas, it has to do with the ideas of 'Being'. Logical thinking can be founded, if logical thinking is outlined simply as a thought system, but if 'Being' is not founded, there is no coherent logical thinking. In general, logical thinking, from this point of view, derives from the metaphysics that one has. That is to say, metaphysics understanding it as a study of 'Being' in general; and there is no logic that can originate in itself. Logic derives from the idea of 'Being' in general that one can have, because a logic that starts from itself cannot be founded, and all logic that is founded starts from a certain metaphysics. In reality, the most developed methodical thoughts, the most advanced logics of humanity of all times, have derived from different metaphysics about 'Being', and have not started from Logic itself. There are a number of neopositivists out there, logicians, mathematicians, and all those who suppose (or rather, say) that their thinking is not metaphysical but simply logical, that they have nothing to do with 'Being', which is a set of logical operations. This operation of neopositivism leads to a whole vision that one has of logic in general, about what can be done with Logic, where Logic begins and ends, about the idea of 'Being' that one has of the entities with which it operates. The neopositivism that claims to derive from any metaphysics is very naive and cannot withstand the onslaught of any metaphysics. It is metaphysical if it has a logical foundation, and there is no logic that starts from itself, it always derives from a metaphysical thinking, therefore it derives from the idea that one has of that absurd abstraction that is 'Being' in general and which does not exist in reality, but which is the basic construction from which a logic can be derived and from which



from which a logic can extract its foundation, of course, in everyday life we do not need either Logic or Metaphysics.

So it is that the broadest abstractions refer to 'Being' and its behaviour, to what is stated as 'logical foundations of thinking'. So it is that the foundations of logical thinking derive from the idea that one has about the maximum abstraction that is the 'Being'. Therefore, if we are going to talk about the foundations of thinking, before talking about a logical structure and all that, we have to say what idea we have of 'Being' in general. The idea that we have of 'Being' in general is this: in the first place, that there is no 'Being' in general, but that it is an abstraction of thinking.

Secondly, that this abstraction is reached by successive operations of differences in thinking.

Third thing, that 'this Being in general' that appears to me as universal or detained. It appears to me because I have made an abstraction, but in reality that abstraction does not exist in itself, but rather exists as a phenomenon of consciousness that elaborates it as a broader and more generalized abstraction. That is the metaphysics that we have on the subject, which is actually an anti-metaphysics. It is an anti-metaphysics from the point of view that it does not consider being as really existent, but rather denies the existence of 'Being' itself.

Kant had referred to 'Being' itself, and had said that one could not speak of it, because it was not known what the thing itself was, then, with his transcendental idealism, he was making his elaborations and talking about what passed in consciousness. We do not say that things do not exist in themselves, and that we know nothing of things in themselves; we say that 'Being', as the maximum conceptual amplitude, does not exist in itself. That 'Being' is the product of the work of the operations of thinking carried to the maximum abstraction. That is our metaphysics! We say that the 'Being' in itself does not exist (the broad 'Being'), that things do exist, but not the 'wide Being', abstract, maximally conceptual, detained, timeless. So, Logic, the foundations of thinking, the method of thinking, we base it on a metaphysics that denies the existence of 'Being', it is a kind of anti-metaphysics that is also metaphysics after all, but where the existence is denied. real of 'Being' as maximum abstraction.

Universal principles and laws can serve as foundations for thinking. Based on accepted principles, general laws are formulated. The greatest amplitude of the behavior of entities is formulated in principles. Normally you can find - and in some textbooks this is very prominent - that the principles have no foundation, they are taken for granted, they are taken for granted. No! The principles are given based on universal laws.

Based on accepted principles, general laws are formulated that must obviously be less extensive than the principles, although the greatest possible extension in order to be applied to the most diverse phenomena. The universal principles and laws are those that serve the development and foundation of the so-called sciences, things that do not interest us. But it is the universal principles and laws, and it is the logical articulation of thinking that serves as the foundation for the so-called sciences; and if the sciences do not have a foundation in principles and universal laws, and do not have a logical system of thinking, and do not have basic and metaphysical ideas about 'Being' in general; if science does not have that substratum behind it, then they are not science, they are empirical, they are sets of empirical knowledge that serve technique, but not science.

Because science is speculative in nature even if it is applied to reality, while empirical science is work on given data. Sometimes the empirical advances and the technique goes faster than science, and what is happening in the technical world makes science rethink many questions. This is frequent! Do not think that everything that has occurred in the world has occurred because some subjects were thinking philosophically. The technique develops, takes flight regardless of what happens at the level of science; but then, we are not talking about science! Let's agree, we are talking about technique, which is very progressive, very interesting, but we cannot call someone named José Juan; this is called technique, technical development, empiricism, but if we talk about the foundations of that technique, that empiricism, then we are talking about science, and if we talk about science, we talk about principles, laws, hypotheses, theories, we are talking about a logical system of articulation of scientific thinking and a metaphysics that is behind it. If not, we don't talk about science. And when an email appears in the newspapers, and it is said: "The scientist Scheel determined

are half mixed, Heist's good idea, now a scientist, talking about it. Every exercise, because it is about things how it has been proceeding by difference, and how we also notice a difference in the metaphysics of 'Being' in general (which we say has no existence in itself), and how one can speak of laws and general principles, and how the scientific system can be articulated, and how we differentiate between what is science and what is technical, or what is empirical practice.

Regarding the method, which is something that science works with, we say here that it is useless to be discussing deduction, induction, etc., as unsatisfactory and not coincident with the operations of logical, structural, rigorous thinking. It is idle, but we can anyway expand a little; It is said, and this is how it is taught in schools, "That the scientific method, scientific thinking uses the inductive method and the deductive method"; thought acts by deduction (that is, from universal principles to particular cases), or thought acts by induction (from particular cases to universal cases)..... So, one asks the teacher for an example. professor, and he says: "Professor, if I wanted to make an induction as you say, to understand a tree, I should start from the particular of the tree and from that arrive at the universal. Isn't that so?" To be able to talk about the tree, I would have to have all the elements that make up the tree, and by taking all those elements I could go on making inductions to reach the most universal thing, which is the tree; from the particular cases to the universal, adding the In particular cases I arrive at the universal, then I begin to study the roots, the trunk, the branches, the leaves, and as soon as I have studied all that I say that I have arrived at the tree. This is how induction would proceed as they tell us.

What does the scientist do when he does science? By chance! When you do science, do you study the root, do you study the trunk, the leaves, this and so on? or uses his ideation in his work and in all the instruments with which he is handling, the laboratory and everywhere. Or you rather believe, or you see it, that the scientist does not have much more operational freedom and is not only deducing and inducing, but is doing a set of extremely complex operations that sometimes have nothing to do with deduction or nothing to do with induction, and that does not make universal formulations. He says "the concept of a tree" and from the concept of a tree he takes small trees until he is left with the seed as Aristotle would do or something similar; or vice versa, that by summation of what is happening in the roots and so on, it gives us a complete idea of a tree. By no means, the scientist and the biologist sometimes have much more structural ideas; and the tree is explaining to us not by the tree, the tree is explaining to us by the type of soil where the tree is located, by the type of ambient humidity, by the type of fertilizer, by the type of nitrogenous bacteria, by solar action, for lots of things. He has nothing to do with the tree, and if we make an induction of the tree, of particular things from its universal that is the tree, we do not understand anything. And it is thanks to the relationship of the tree with its environment and the transformations that are operated, that the entire feedback system establishes, it is thanks to this structural understanding that we can talk about how the tree moves thanks to the action of the light, at atmospheric pressure, thanks to a lot of factors that in no way explain the functioning of the tree by the inductive sum of the given elements, No! By no means by induction do we arrive at the understanding of the tree. Do you get the idea? And in no way by deduction, by the idea of a tree we explain the functioning of the tree by lowering it to a particular case. Scientific thinking is much more complex than locking oneself into a methodical system that is explained to us in schools, and where we are told that the scientific method proceeds by induction. Scientific thinking does not proceed by induction nor does it proceed by deduction; scientific thinking proceeds in a complex way, and sometimes makes inductions and sometimes makes deductions, and sometimes moves structurally. And that is the reality of scientific thinking. And anyone who has had contact with any scientific operation will know that it is so: and that, by summation, by addition of inductions, it does not reach the understanding of the object.

That is why we say here, that as regards the method, it is useless to discuss induction and deduction as unsatisfactory and not coincident with the operations of logical, structural, rigorous thinking, because anyone realizes that this is how things work. Sometimes the scientific inductive method is confused with the work of thinking different from mathematical thinking where very broad hypotheses and so on are put, and they go down like a ladder, deductively,

a number of things. Neither does deductive thinking work like that, nor does it work like that in Mathematics or Logic. And now we go to the field of logic where deductive thinking would work. We have seen the case of the natural sciences where they said that inductive thought (from the particular to the universal) worked, and we see that this is not the case.

Let's go to the case of Logic, where they tell us that Logic works with the deductive method, let's see if the deduction example is true: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. And that is how they explain to us at school that Logic proceeds; Logic takes a universal, and if within that universal there are particulars, those particulars must have the same behavior as the universal in which they are embedded, is that clear? This is called deduction.

So it is said that there is a major premise, a minor premise, a middle ground, and there is a conclusion. If Socrates is included in the category of men, and men are mortal, logically, deductively, Socrates is mortal, that's kind of the idea.

So, it gives the impression that one was actually putting universal things and deducing them. Fine! But now let's get a little deeper into logical thinking, and see how it is possible for me to do such a thing: I can say; all men are mortal, say Socrates is a man, and then say Socrates is mortal. Only thanks to the fact that I have posited before drawing that conclusion and before articulating the premises in this way with each other, I already posited some kind of result. In a way, it is not that I am deducing the particulars from the universal, but intentionally, structurally, I have put the conclusion in some way and then I have organized the premises with each other in such a way that they fit. Let's see if you pay attention, because if I say, all men are mortal and then I say, José is a man, it won't turn out that Socrates is mortal. If I relate all men to all that, it is because obviously that is directed along a line, and directing thinking along a line means that at the end of that line there is already an object placed. I could not put major premises, minor premises and middle terms, and draw conclusions; if the solution that I later say is not true or false. Because if I say, all men are mortal, camels are mortal, therefore men are camels, there I find a case of a false syllogism, right? progressively hooking the elements that combine well with each other, if there was no intention put into the conclusion I would not organize the premises in any way. That's what I'm saying!

Consequently, deductive thinking does not derive from the most universal to the most particular, but rather the intention is set in the particular, and since the intention is set in the particular, then I am structuring the relationships between the major and minor premises, This is a discovery that by 1930 was already made by a certain Fender, a disciple of the thinking of phenomenological logic. Fender structures phenomenological logic and discovers very clearly that in deductive thought there is no such deduction, but that all the intentionality of thinking is placed in the conclusion. It is the conclusion that is asking me to organize the premises in this way with each other. So in deductive thinking, saying that deductive thinking is the method used by logic is not correct, and saying that inductive thinking is the method used by the natural sciences is also not correct; as soon as we start to think about those things. But normally one is told these things, and says: "Well, induction such a thing, deduction such a thing and..." That's it! It seems that thinking was not like that, but that thinking included deductive operations, inductive operations, and operations of another nature. And what are deductive operations, inductive operations and all that? These operations are what we call proceeding by difference. This proceeding by difference is what they in other times called proceeding by deduction, and they believed that it was a simple sequence to proceed by relation, to proceed by synthesis. Do you see how long sequences of thought that later appeared as methods have disassociated themselves from the operations of thought? They are complex operations of thinking, of that thinking that proceeds from differences, from relationships between differences, and from the structuring of relationships between differences, which is a synthesis.

These operations of thinking, amputated, separated, have appeared as methodical lines of which it has been said that it is the deductive method, it is the inductive method but, in reality, it is

It deals with thought operations. So, if we talk about a method of thought, what should we attend to? What must be attended to when speaking of a method of thought is the operations of thinking, and one cannot speak of a method of thinking that does not attend to the operations of thinking. And what are the operations of thought? They are the operations that work by difference, by relation between the differences, and by structuring the relations between the differences. Therefore, a proper method of thinking, which is based on the operations of thinking, derives from there and not from elsewhere; because it derives from the operations and not from another part, and it is not prefabricated, and the branches are not cut and then a methodical line is drawn, good; So, we are talking about a method of a structural type, (it has nothing to do with the structuralism that is so fashionable and other tales). We are talking about a structural method based on the behavior of a phenomenon-experience structure, which is a different method of referring to the method as an expression of reality.

The method is not only a formal framing that serves to organize thought in the face of a given problem, but is also an expression of the structural dynamics of reality. The method, finally, is moved as the very reality of the phenomenon that occurs in the temporal moment and in the extension.

Extension and moment serve as a frame for the phenomenon, etc., it becomes complicated and ends by saying that in the application of a method, here extension and moment serve as a frame for the phenomenon. There is no framing in the phenomenon if one does not speak of method, if extension and moment are not taken into account; what the logicians of the past would have called the time-space categories. Without time-space categories, phenomena are not included. Every time a phenomenon is discussed, it is framed in these two categories. In extension and moment it fits the phenomenon, so that when I study any phenomenon, the first thing I wonder about is space and time. Not just for history, right? but for any type of phenomenon in extension and moment. In the application of the method, interest sets the scope and consciousness analyzes, complements and synthesizes, the interest being moved by the consciousness-phenomenon relationship. There are people who, when applying the method, force reality in such a way, that they try to interest the observation of an object, that reality cannot stand. How are you going to observe the recorder, from the point of view of Chinese music? The fact that this recorder can release Chinese music with a cassette is something very different from the fact that you set an interest of this nature, because the recorder as a tool object of the world, of daily life, already establishes a scope that admits that certain interests refer to it, and there are other interests that do not refer to it. There are things in which you cannot fix an interest that reality itself cannot bear. Let's see if I explain myself! So, in the world of everyday life, it is the things themselves that are somehow putting the interest, and they are fixing the interest on you, so that you turn it over to it, and you cannot force things in such a way that you consider, For example, the Saturn rocket or something like that, from the point of view of room decoration, it can only be useful to the extent that you have a beautiful color photograph and put it on the wall; but it's not about the Saturn rocket anymore, do you get the idea? And it seems that in questions of method, there are people who make a lot of mistakes, and then they put points of interest as they please and without noticing that reality itself is dictating an area in which some interests and others can circulate. interests can not walk; so that's a point..... When an interest is set on an object, you have to check if that object by its nature allows that interest to be placed or not, first thing, or if the rocket thing doesn't happen to us Saturn. Second: Interest sets the scope, and consciousness analyzes, complements, and synthesizes, the interest being moved in turn by the consciousness-phenomenon relationship. Every phenomenon in process, is operating just like the method.

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Silo's work has been extensive and is found in print in books published by various publishers and languages, some of them also in audio and/or video form. But it is his conversations (so we have called them because they have an "informal" and sometimes almost fortuitous character) in the presence of one or many of us, the followers of his school of thought, that abound as material. It is interesting to keep it as such because they express much of the Siloist doctrine and in some way the process that Silo was carrying out. A material that always circulated quickly among everyone in a type of format, but after his death and because it was not "official" material, it has become fragile. For this reason, we wanted to try to preserve what we have in a format that guarantees its preservation as it circulated.

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